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Ethics Education Volume 15, No 1 2009

John Paul II and Christian Personalism vs. Peter Singer and
Utilitarianism: Two Radically Opposed Conceptions of the
Nature and Meaning of Sufferingi
By Peter J. Colosi
St Charles Borromeo Seminary
Abstract
Although Christian ethics and contemporary utilitarianism both employ
terms such as “love” and “compassion”, they are in fact polar opposite
ethical views. This fact is not at all easy to discern. One key to perceiving
the radical opposition between them lies in clarifying their respective
concepts of suffering. In the Christian view, suffering is always understood
as the suffering of individual persons, while in utilitarianism suffering is
primarily understood as a quantifiable entity detached from the individuals
who experience it. The paper attempts a primarily philosophical elucidation
of this difference, including some theological points, by taking as its point
of departure John Paul II’s presentation of the three-fold sense in which
suffering has the potential to “unleash of love.” Following a presentation of
the utilitarian view, it then proceeds to explore the relation between
suffering and love by probing the public statements on the experience of
Peter Singer in the struggle with his mother’s debilitating illness. The paper
concludes with the presentation of a premise built into the structure of
contemporary utilitarian ethics rendering it inherently self-defeating with
respect to its own stated goal.
1.

The Meaning of Suffering According to Pope John Paul II

From time immemorial humanity has sought to discover a meaning in
suffering, and many deep answers have been given, some partial and
others more full. For example, The Book of Job teaches that while suffering
is rightly understood as punishment due in justice to a wrong-doer,
nonetheless, the innocent suffer also, as a test of their faithfulness.ii In
more recent times, we have the profound work of Viktor Frankl who told
us that hidden in the depths of the worst types of suffering there is a task
to be discovered related to the fulfilment of one’s unrepeatable earthly
vocation.
In asking the question, “What is the reason for suffering?” one could
understand the word “reason” in two senses. First, one could mean by
“reason,” “cause.” In this sense the question is searching for what it is that
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brought suffering into existence at all. I think there are two answers to the
question in this sense; one is accessible with faith, and the other is
understandable to all persons of good will. Faith teaches that the
combination of demons and original sin account for suffering, and on a
natural level one sees the fact that we human persons do not love each
other enough as its cause.iii
Once suffering exists in the world, however, one can ask about its
“reason” in a second sense. Given its existence, one can ask about the
inner meaning of suffering, how it relates to other aspects of our lives, and
what our response to it should be?
In this second sense of the “reason” for suffering, perhaps the most
concise, straightforward answer to the question was given by Pope John
Paul II when he said that “Suffering is…present in order to unleash love.”iv
This “unleashing” is meant by the Pope in a three-fold sense: 1) In the
interior life of persons as the opening of a certain interior disposition of the
heart, a sensitivity of heart which has an emotional expression unique to it,v
2) Externally, giving birth to works of love towards neighbor,vi 3) and
culturally, transforming the whole of human civilization into a civilization of
love.vii
Many authors of recent times, including John Paul II, have developed the
point that persons ought never to be conceived of as a means to an end,
no matter how noble that end.viii Responding to another person as an end,
in the minds of these authors means respecting another person for that
other’s own sake, because of their inner worth and preciousness. Related
to that is the interesting relationship that if one person does respect
another as an end, it also happens that, as a surprising fruit of such respect,
moral values and happiness spring up in the inner life of the one who
shows such respect. This is sometimes expressed in the surprise of
volunteer health care aids when they say, “I received so much more from
those whom I served than I could ever have given to them!” Along these
lines, John Paul II perceives something internal to the very nature of
suffering itself that is conducive to the realization of love; in fact, he goes
so far as to say that “…man owes to suffering that unselfish love which
stirs in his heart and actions.”ix Thus, we might want to say that although
persons ought never to be conceived of as mere means to the achievement
of any end (even love and happiness), it nevertheless seems that there is
some sort of mysterious ordination within suffering to achieve the end of
the flourishing of love. Incidentally, we ought not be too quick to assume
that those who help the suffering are the only ones who grow in this
interior experience of love. Indeed, sometimes it is a more difficult
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challenge for the suffering one to grow in love towards the one who helps
him – this presupposes, for example, a profound humility to accept the
help and to be thankful.
This point, that the flourishing of love is a kind of side-effect, is important
because if one held that the ultimate meaning (in the sense of raison
d’être) of suffering were its ability to cause love to flourish, then it seems
that one comes too close to reducing persons in their suffering to a mere
means to the achievement of other ends, and also to the view that love
ultimately depends on the existence of evil.x The character of Ivan, in The
Brother’s Karamazov, rightly rebels against this notion when he wants to
give back his ticket into heaven if it depends on the suffering of a child.xi
For example, if little children who are sexually abused, tortured and then
killed, end up in heaven, then pointing to that result as an exhaustive
explanation for the child’s suffering is not acceptable.xii Perhaps it is for this
reason that the Pope says that the mystery of suffering is “an especially
impenetrable one.”xiii
While I see no easy solution to the problem of innocent suffering, it seems
that we are able to give an answer, even if not exhaustive, to the question
about the inner meaning of suffering if we relate it to love: In the care and
respect generously given to those who suffer, and generously accepted by
them, it seems there is a power that has as its fruit the flourishing of love.
With respect to innocent suffering, one could say, I think, that if this sideeffect of the flourishing of love were to become wide-spread, certainly
deliberate hurting of the innocent would tend towards extinction.xiv
2.

The Utilitarian Conception of Suffering

Another attempt at an answer to the question about the meaning of
suffering, this one from the 18th and 19th centuries, has been given by the
ethical movement known as utilitarianism. This ethical theory found its first
well worked-out defense in Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). Subsequently, John Stuart Mill
developed a vigorous philosophical defense of utilitarianism against
Bentham’s critics in his Utilitarianism (1863) and also, to a lesser extent, in
his earlier On Liberty (1859). This view has its most famous and perhaps
most logically consistent contemporary proponent in Professor Peter Singer
of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University, and for
this reason I will primarily analyse his thought as representative of this view.
Although Christian ethics and utilitarianism both employ terms such as
“love” and “compassion”, they are in fact polar opposite ethical views.
This fact is not at all easy to discern.xv Yet, it seems that the key to
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perceiving clearly the radical opposition between them lies in clarifying the
concept of suffering in each view. In the Christian view, suffering is always
understood as the suffering of individual persons, while in utilitarianism
suffering is primarily understood as a quantifiable entity detached from the
individuals who experience it.
Three basic principles make up utilitarian ethics. The consequentialist
principle, which states that “the rightness, or wrongness, of an action is
determined by the goodness, or badness of the results that flow from it.”xvi
Secondly, the hedonist principle, which states that “the only thing that is
good in itself is pleasure and the only thing bad in itself is pain.”xvii Finally,
the principle of extent, which takes into account the number of people
affected by the action.xviii The following simple formulation of ethical
utilitarianism emerges: the rightness of an action is determined by its
contribution to the happiness (pleasure) of the greatest number of people
affected by it.
The principle of extent distinguishes utilitarianism from basic hedonism. A
strict hedonist would agree with the consequentialist and the hedonistic
principles, but would reject the principle of extent, saying, “those actions
are right which increase my pleasure.” A utilitarian, by contrast, takes into
account the pleasure of the greatest number of people concerned,
calculating himself in as no more or less important than one unit who can
experience pleasure. John Stuart Mill encapsulates this idea:
…the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is
right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of
all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of
others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a
disinterested and benevolent spectator.xix
Peter Singer is committed to these principles, though he does not speak of
“pleasure fulfillment,” as classical utilitarianism does, but rather of
“preference fulfillment,”xx and “interest fulfillment,” saying, “we define
‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in
their interests”.xxi Of all people who can experience the desire to have their
preferences fulfilled, a calculation ought to be made in order to discern
which act will result in the satisfaction of the most preferences. That action
ought to be chosen.xxii Singer sees all other considerations, which propose
not doing that act which would increase the overall welfare, as either
selfish, or constraining true morality.xxiii
Singer accepts as morally relevantxxiv what we could call “suffering as a
quantifiable entity.” Suffering in this sense is morally relevant because it is
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the contrary opposite of the only good: pleasure – or as Singer would say,
preference fulfillment. His view, I think, could be represented by saying that
if we could stick a thermometer into the world which would measure the
amount of over-all suffering, then a right action is any one which makes
the needle go down. His commitment to this view leads him to make
assertions that seem shocking to some. For example, he thinks that
concern for one’s own leisure or enjoyment,xxv and concern for one’s own
familyxxvi often constitute moral failure, since actions based on these
concerns do not maximize preference fulfillment for the greatest number
of people. In addition, action based on the criterion of the absolute moral
norms of traditional ethics may also constitute moral failure, since such
actions at times do not maximize preference fulfillment. Singer boldly
states,
…from trite rules against lying and stealing to such noble
constructions as justice and human rights…when the
debunked principles have been scrutinized, found wanting,
and cleared away, we will be left with nothing but the
impartial rationality of the principle of equal consideration of
interests.xxvii
This view also leads Singer to draw the surprising conclusion that the
behavior of Blessed Mother Teresa of Calcutta was irrational, indeed he
might say immoral,
Mother Teresa described her love for others as love for each of
a succession of individuals, rather than “love of mankind,
merely as such.” If we were more rational, we would be
different: we would use our resources to save as many lives as
possible, irrespective of whether we do it by reducing the road
toll or by saving specific, identifiable lives.xxviii
It seems to me that Singer perceives a mutually exclusive and competitive
relationship between the following two types of love,
A. Individual love in which two persons face each other. Mother
Teresa’s use of the word “succession” implies that each individual
relationship is based on an attitude of care and respect that demands
one’s full attention before moving on to the next person.
B. Non-individual love, which Singer calls “love of mankind, merely as
such.”
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The nature of the competition seems to be that love A, if practiced, saps
time, energy and resources from love B. Thus, the perceived irrationality of
practicing A is grounded in the utilitarian principle of extent: this axiom-like
principle assumes that reducing the quantity of suffering trumps all other
ethical concerns; and, staying with the traffic law scenario, since Mother
Teresa is not, for example, spending her energy calculating auto accident
rates against various speed limit options, she is not as rational as she might
be.
As it becomes clearer that utilitarian ethical theory tends to relegate
individual love to the sidelines, the question sometimes arises why it is that
this ethical view has such a large following.xxix There is a plausibility to it
grounded in a kernel of truth: We do all hope that large scale suffering
diminishes. We all hope rightly, for example, that when a natural disaster
hits that as few people as possible are harmed. But as John Crosby points
out, the flaw in this view is that it does not distinguish between personal
causes and natural causes,
…consequentialism teaches that, to the extent that events are
subject to our control, we should bring about just those results
which, when events are not subject to us, we hope for. It
teaches that a moral agent is just as much a natural cause as
the causes beyond our control, and should distinguish itself
from other natural causes by being as beneficent a cause as
possible, intervening in the world out of the same beneficence
that it feels in the form of wishing and hoping at those times
when it can only look on helplessly.xxx
This is the reason for which utilitarian ethics tosses all absolute moral laws
out of ethics: it sees no difference between a boulder killing a person and
one person killing another person so long as in both cases some greater
good resulted – and the ultimate result of this is the theoretical rejection of
the specifically personal and inner dimension of morality, including the type
of love exhibited by Mother Teresa.
The utilitarian view of suffering, then, can be understood to split suffering
off from the individual who suffers in order to obtain an entity which can
be measured. Then, ethical decisions are arrived at by determining which
action would reduce the overall amount of suffering on earth; including
the killing of an innocent person when that single death will reduce overall
suffering.
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3.

The Interior Unleashing of Love

The Christian view, on the other hand, does not accept the severing of
suffering from the individual who undergoes it. On the Christian view there
are two, not just one, morally relevant factors: suffering and individual
persons who have a lofty worth. As Dietrich von Hildebrand summarized
well, both of these factors motivate moral action,
We see a poor man in great need. The need of this man, his
sufferings and troubles, are a disvalue. We grasp the call to do
away with this disvalue. Our value response of love for this
suffering man is at the basis of the negative response to his
sufferings. Our will to help him is really motivated by the value
of a human person, and the disvalue of his sufferings.xxxi
This radical difference between the utilitarian and the Christian views of
suffering has profound consequences with respect to the threefold sense in
which, according to John Paul II, suffering is meant to “unleash love.” The
utilitarian view of suffering makes this unleashing of love impossible, while
the Christian view of suffering is able, precisely because of that unity
between suffering and the individual person who suffers, to achieve the
threefold release of love.
Max Scheler presents the idea that in Christianity there is an internal
change on the part of the one who gives help that is a primary dimension
of morality, and which is lost on utilitarianism in its exclusive focus on the
external help that the giving brings about. Scheler recalls the story of the
rich young man who told Jesus that he has followed the commandments
his entire life and wanted to know what more he could do to follow Him.
Scripture tells us,
Jesus, looking at him, loved him and said to him, “You are
lacking one thing. Go, sell what you have, and give to [the]
poor and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow
me.” At that statement his face fell, and he went away sad, for
he had many possessions.xxxii
Scheler points out that,
When the rich youth is told to divest himself of his riches and
give them to the poor, it is really not in order to help the
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“poor” and to effect a better distribution of property in the
interest of the general welfare…The order is given because the
act of giving away, and the spiritual freedom and abundance
of love which manifest themselves in this act, ennoble the
youth and make him even “richer” than he is.xxxiii
Scheler’s point is that in the Christian view, full cognizance is taken
of two incomparable goods that come about in morality: the moral
good of the benefactor and the objective good of the recipient.xxxiv
The help given, he points out, can be small while the love is great or
the help great while the love is small, remarking that love is not a
mere “institution of charity.”xxxv And John Paul II states that,
…every individual must feel as if called personally to bear
witness to love in suffering. The institutions are very important
and indispensable; nevertheless, no institution can by itself
replace the human heart, human compassion, human love or
human initiative, when it is a question of dealing with the
sufferings of another. This refers to physical sufferings, but it is
even more true when it is a question of the many kinds of
moral suffering, and when it is primarily the soul that is
suffering.xxxvi
John Paul II explains that it often takes a long, long time for the answer to
our question about the meaning of suffering to become clear. He explains
that the reason for this is that although God hears the question, He does
not answer it directly, nor abstractly.xxxvii The answer to the question of
suffering, namely, its presence in the world for the releasing of love, only
becomes clear to a person by participating in suffering and making a
personal response to it – only then is a certain interior peace and spiritual
joy in the midst of suffering possible.xxxviii
The notion that one can only understand suffering through personal
experience relates to one such personal experience of Peter Singer, written
about in a profile piece on him.xxxix In a rare but complete break with his
entire philosophical corpus, Peter Singer himself glimpsed the deepest
source of the intrinsic worth of persons. Singer’s mother, who became ill
with Alzheimer’s disease, reached a point in her life where she no longer
recognized Singer, his sister, or her grandchildren and she had lost the
ability to reason. She was in a state in which, according to Singer’s theory,
she did not meet the definition of a person.xl According to his ethical
theory, she ought to have been killed, or been left to die, and certainly no
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money should have been spent on her survival, since the moral calculus
would require that such money be spent increasing the preference
fulfillment of the greatest number of people. Instead, Singer and his sister
hired a team of health-care aids to look after her, spending tens of
thousands of dollars in the process.xli Michael Specter, the author of the
piece, asked Singer about this, who first responded, in an attempt to
remain consistent with his views, that this was “probably not the best use
you could make of my money….”xlii However, on further probing, Singer
said to Specter: “I think this has made me see how the issues of someone
with these kinds of problems are really very difficult…. Perhaps it is more
difficult than I thought before, because it is different when it’s your
mother.”xliii Now this experience of Peter Singer with his mother can be
analyzed philosophically, and the first thing to point out is that his actions
coincide with the Christian view for, it is precisely when Singer gets into
the position of reuniting suffering with a specific individual person (one
whom he loves) that he reverses in his actions what he insists upon in his
books.
The difference, when it is your mother, is that you love her, and this is a
highly relevant fact for a theory of ethics. Love opens one’s eyes to the true
source of the worth of persons: their uniqueness.xliv It is precisely a glimpse
of the unrepeatable uniqueness of another person which inspires love (the
grasp merely of the blunt fact that another person has consciousness, for
example, cannot inspire love for them). Once this glimpse is achieved and
love springs forth in the soul – as it does like a surprising gift – that love
then has the remarkable power of allowing one to see more clearly and
deeply both the humanity and the unique preciousness of the person you
love, and then that sight in turn inspires more love. With one’s mother this
process of loving and seeing has occurred quite a lot and the vision of
worth and preciousness is overwhelming.xlv When that has occurred, there
can be no argument concerning an inability to think about one’s future
preference fulfillment (one of Singer’s favorites)xlvi that could make a
person kill the one they love – or in any other way abandon her.
Of course, some hold the view that it is merciful to kill someone who is in
pain; that, however, is not love, but abandonment. The request to be killed
is actually a plea for two basic things: to be loved and to have pain relief.
As soon as these people feel loved and/or have their pain managed, they
no longer ask to be killed (and are grateful that their request was not
heeded). Pain is the trump card used by pro-euthanasia activists to promote
their cause, but in our high-tech world we have the ability to eliminate this
reason for the request to be killed. With respect to the other reason,
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feeling like an unloved nuisance, we must rise to the challenge presented
by the recognition that loving each person is an infinitely higher value than
cost management and perfect physical health.
It is very important to point out that while the love you have for someone is
one reason why you would never kill that person, it is not the deepest
reason. The deepest reason is the inner worth of the person. Your love for
another is inside of you, but the humanity, uniqueness and preciousness of
others are inside them. What happens when you love someone is that you
can see more clearly the inner worth of the other person. Other persons
have this inner worth whether or not they are loved, so no one should kill
them – but unless love is in the picture one might have trouble knowing
about their inner worth.
This experience of Singer has the possibility of revealing to his mind a truth
that until now has been completely lost on utilitarians so concerned about
the masses: the deepest source of the worth of every person lies in the very
fact that there is no one else in existence, nor ever was, nor ever will be,
nor could be, who is the same as another person, and among the reasons
for the absolute inviolability of each person, this is the highest. Love has
the power to make one know this truth about the persons one actually
loves, but it also has the power to make one know that this is true of every
person.xlvii It seems to me that this knowledge about the intrinsic worth of
persons which is gained through love is accessible to believers and nonbelievers in God.
In a 2004 book chapterxlviii Singer responded to the reactions generated by
this conflict between his life and his theory in the following way. He notes
that, “My critics have claimed that, by paying for home care for my mother
after she began to suffer from dementia, I have violated the standard of
impartiality that I advocate.”xlix He proceeds to point out that R.M. Hare
offered him an idea that might lead to the view that Singer’s action
towards his mother was morally right, “R.M. Hare has suggested that
because I know my mother well, and can see that the money being spent
on her care does mean that she gets excellent health care, and does not
suffer, the money is well-spent.”l Singer quickly rejects this offer and,
surprisingly, joins the ranks of his critics – against himself:
Suppose, however, that it were crystal clear that the money
could do more good elsewhere. Then I would be doing wrong
in spending it on my mother, just as I do wrong when I spend,
on myself or my family, money that could do more good if
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donated to an organization that helps people in much greater
need than we are. I freely admit to not doing all that I should;
but I could do it, and the fact that I do not do it does not
vitiate the claim that it is what I should do.li
This answer is sophistical because he implicitly equates two unequal ideas:
on the one hand, donating money to the poor in the form of tithing, and
on the other hand, killing someone and then donating the money you
gained from that to the poor.
Also, Singer himself admits that this position leads to “the further question
of whether it makes sense to ask why we should act morally, and if it does,
what kind of an answer it is possible to give…”lii Although he has written
on this question elsewhere,liii the following set of questions comes to mind
here,
1.

Has he learned from this experience and made a firm intention
not to make this moral error in the future. For example, when his
wife, children or sister become debilitated, will he do what he
believes to be the “right thing” and kill them?

2.

If it is the case that his action towards his mother, while in direct
opposition to his written work, does not negate his theories, how
many such actions of his would it take to negate them?

3.

If he is convinced that he did an objective wrong against the
greater good when he cared for his mother, does he also think
that he has thereby incurred moral guilt by caring for her?liv

Most people do not respect a teacher who doesn’t live according to the
demands he makes on others. If Singer had said in this paragraph: “I want
to apologize to all my followers for my error, and to assure them that if this
same situation happens with any other family members of mine, I will not
let you down again,” then I would in one sense be harder pressed to write
against him now. But, since instead he wrote, “The fact that I do not do it
[the right utilitarian act] does not vitiate the claim that it is what I should
do,” we can conclude, I think, that he has no firm resolution not to err
again; that is, he very well may act in just the same way with other ill family
members; he may care for them - only time will tell. And so, why is it, we
could wonder, that the leader of this movement is allowed to do the exact
opposite of what he preaches - and boldly admit it - adding that none of
this undercuts his theoretical assertions?
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I must note one further point concerning his remark that “the fact that I do
not do it [the right utilitarian act] does not vitiate the claim that it is what I
should do.” That remark is meant to blunt his critics who hold up his care
for his mother against his theory as a blatant contradiction, but in the
opening lines of Practical Ethics Singer himself asserts that “…ethics is not
an ideal system that is noble in theory but no good in practice. The reverse
is closer to the truth: an ethical judgment that is no good in practice must
suffer from a theoretical defect…”lv Singer is famous for following his first
principles all the way to their (extreme) logical conclusions, well, it seems
that it is not only his critics who think that his action towards his mother
vitiates his ethical theory, he does too! Will he follow this text to its logical
conclusion and drop his theory, since it is no good in his very own practice?
These questions and the contradictions in Singer’s thought are important,
but even they do not approach the real problem. The real problem is
expressed in the following question,
4.

Why can’t Singer take the step from his experience with his
mother to see that Mother Teresa’s way of life is the most
rational? She acted in the same way he did towards his mother
with every person she met.

I grant that this would be a hard task for most of us to achieve, but her
noble effort never to abandon anyone springs from an insight that Singer
rejects over and over again: no person is replaceable, and no person ever
loses their worth. Love, which clarifies the vision of the beloved, is an
experience common to believers and non-believers alike, and so even
though Singer is an atheist, these insights, which guided Blessed Mother
Teresa’s life, are available to him through his experience with his mother.
Singer dubs the view that all humans have equal and lofty worth,
regardless of their cognitive abilities, “speciesism,” and holds that it has
never been shown to be true by philosophers.lvi But his argument against
(what he calls) speciesism in favor of killing those humans who have lost
much of their cognitive abilities denies the deepest source of love intrinsic
to persons: their uniqueness. Were he to reflect on his experience with his
mother, he would see that no aspect of our species membership alone
could be the intrinsic aspect of another which inspires love.lvii
4.

The Exterior and Cultural Unleashing of Love

Does this emphasis on the interior growth of love mean that Christianity
neglects the exterior goal of actually reducing suffering, and in particular
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on a large-scale? I think the many examples of Christian charitable
organizations and hospitals illustrate just the reverse. Also, in the document
we are considering, the Pope spends a series of paragraphs reflecting on
the parable of the Good Samaritan, which
…witnesses to the fact that Christ’s revelation of the salvific
meaning of suffering is in no way identified with an attitude of
passivity. Completely the reverse is true. The Gospel is the
negation of passivity in the face of suffering.lviii
He points out that it is difficult to list in this sort of document all the types
of “Good Samaritan” work that exist in the Church and in society,
although he does name the profession of the doctor and the nurse with
great enthusiasm, noting that these have an evangelical content raising
them to the level of a vocation rather than a mere profession.lix And so,
although there are times when the only way possible to help another is to
offer compassion in the form of an interior love of the suffering person, the
Good Samaritan does not stop at sympathy and compassion, but not
sparing material meanslx goes to the point of making a gift of his whole
being to the other – and this is accomplished in bringing actual help in
suffering whatever its nature may be.lxi One of the documents of the
Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, teaches that interior love is a
direct result of a genuine exterior giving of oneself, lxii and this giving can
take many forms.
Finally, I would like to mention the third way in which suffering is meant to
unleash love: the bringing into existence of a civilization of love. In a
civilization of love, large scale suffering would be greatly reduced, yet the
realization of such a civilization is inseparably linked to the first of the
three-fold senses in which suffering exists to unleash love: an interior,
affective love of individual persons whom one faces. The following text
from a daily meditation book concisely expresses this idea:
The ultimate solution for restoring and promoting justice at all
levels lies in the heart of each man. It is in the heart that every
type of injustice imaginable comes into existence, and it is
there also that the possibility of straightening out all human
relationships is conceived.lxiii
This idea suggests that the solution to worldwide suffering lies in the heart
of each person. This inner life of persons is precisely that dimension of
morality which is relegated to the sidelines in utilitarian ethics, and for this
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reason it is incapable of achieving its own stated goal: the elimination of
worldwide suffering.
I said above, with Scheler, that this love in the inner life of persons for
individuals, the love that Christ was hoping would blossom in the heart of
the rich young man, can only blossom through concrete acts of self-giving,
and for this reason it did not blossom in the heart of the rich young man.
But I also think that the relief of suffering on a large scale will not occur on
earth unless such love in the inner life of persons is present there.
This point brings up the very difficult question concerning the emotional
involvement of health care providers with their patients. It seems to me
that the two extremes are, on the one hand, an exaggerated or unhealthy
degree of personal involvement in the lives of patients, and on the other, a
complete suppression of any and all affective relating to patients. Neither
of these two extremes is appropriate. But, I do not think that the solution
to the hardship on healthcare providers who feel appropriate emotions in
their work can be the recommendation of extreme stoicism.
With respect to interior love as the main source of the relief of suffering on
earth, the Catholic tradition goes so far as to say that the completely
cloistered religious, who appear to be doing nothing, actually bring about
more good in the world, even in the form of concrete benefits to persons
who are suffering. For example, in the following text of St. John of the
Cross, he expresses just this view in his advice to persons who achieve the
deepest form of union with God:
It should be noted that until the soul reaches this state of
union of love, she should practice love in both the active and
contemplative life. Yet once she arrives, she should not
become involved in other works and exterior exercises that
might be of the slightest hindrance to the attentiveness of love
toward God, even though the work be of great service to God.
For a little of this pure love is more precious to God and the
soul and more beneficial to the Church, even though it seems
one is doing nothing, than all these other works put
together.lxiv
Yet, even on a more natural level, the cold-hearted calculating method
presented by contemporary utilitarianism will fail. Only love, the kind that is
present when two persons face each other in an attitude of care and
respect, as opposed to a cold assessment of units of pain and preference
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fulfillments, could lead to a society that truly cares for the suffering as
persons.
Thus, I think that the third sense in which suffering is meant to unleash
love is intimately and necessarily connected to the first sense.
5.

Conclusion: The
Utilitarian Ethics

Inherently

Self-defeating

Structure

of

Since utilitarian ethics allows for the killing and abandonment of individual
persons to achieve its stated goal of reducing overall suffering, it has
actually doomed itself to failure from the outset. The link between the
legalization of euthanasia and large-scale killing is not correctable through
“guidelines,” but follows from an inner and unavoidable logic.lxv Not only
has large-scale killing followed on the coattails of legalized euthanasia
historically, but also the logical connection between the two can be
demonstrated. I would formulate that reason like this: to kill or abandon
one single human person, is in a certain sense just as horrible as killing or
abandoning thousands. Since persons are irreplaceably precious, killing one
of them represents an infinite crime, and so killing many is not a “greater”
evil in a quantitative sense, such that when you reach a certain number (say
100,000) only then does it become an immoral state of affairs.lxvi I am
grateful to Dr. Maria Fedoryka for the following formulation: “killing many
persons should be understood as a ‘greater’ evil in the sense that it is
repeating many times over an already infinite crime of violating a unique
person.” And so, if the killing of any person becomes allowed, then the
only foundation on which one could oppose mass killing has been stripped
from the equation. Only a person who understands this can truly bring
about a civilization of love.
On March 20, 2004, Pope John Paul II announced to the participants of an
international conference entitled, “Life-Sustaining Treatments and
Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas,” the following:
I feel the duty to reaffirm strongly that the intrinsic value and
personal dignity of every human being do not change, no
matter what the concrete circumstances of his or her life. A
man, even if seriously ill or disabled in the exercise of his
highest functions, is and always will be a man, and he will
never become a “vegetable” or an “animal.” Even our
brothers and sisters who find themselves in the clinical
condition of a “vegetative state” retain their human dignity in
all its fullness.lxvii
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Suffering is an unavoidable and overwhelming fact of life, yet John Paul II
believes that one of the deepest meanings to be found within it, is its
ability to “unleash love,” which if realized in individual cases, will
eventually result in an entire civilization of love. There is, however, a strong
temptation to think that people who are sick have lost their worth and do
not deserve love and care. It is for this reason, it seems to me, that the
Catechism of the Catholic Church insists that “Those whose lives are
diminished or weakened deserve special respect;”lxviii not because they are
worth more than the healthy, but because it is too easy for the healthy to
forget that they still have all of their personal dignity. As soon as love
comes into the picture, however, the right attitude towards individuals
returns. Despite his experience with his mother, Peter Singer has yet to
admit this in writing. His answer that he did wrong when he cared for his
mother, as one of my students put it, “excuses his action, but does not
express the motive for it.”lxix His critics are looking for that motive, and so I
will suggest one: he did not kill his mother because he loves her, and this
love made him see the reasons within her being for which she should not
be killed.
If utilitarians are sincere in their desire to bring about the greatest good for
the greatest number of people, let them strive to achieve a civilization of
love on the only basis possible: the inviolable preciousness of every person.
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